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In der Schriftenreihe FFU-Report werden seit 1993 Diskussionspapiere aus dem Forschungs-
programm des FFU veröffentlicht. Ergebnisse sollen so frühzeitig einer interessierten Öf-
fentlichkeit zugänglich gemacht werden. Die Reports durchlaufen einen internen fachli-
chen Review-Prozess. Die vertretenen Positionen liegen in der Verantwortung der Autoren 





This paper describes eight selected "best practice" cases of the acceleration of technical 
progress in climate policy. These are cases in which the diffusion of low-carbon technolo-
gies has been accelerated by policies, involving not just renewable energies, but also en-
ergy efficiency policies (the latter being considered more difficult). The author's objective 
is to describe the phenomenon and its variants, as well as offering a theoretical interpre-
tation, which focuses on the interplay of three feedback mechanisms subject to demand-
ing targets. Conclusions are then drawn from these sections for an ambitious climate pol-
icy that addresses both the acceleration in climate change and the competition for low-
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Climate policy is currently shaped at two levels: international policy level and the level of 
industrial policy and innovation competition for climate-friendly technologies. The highly 
dynamic competition on the global markets for low-carbon products, processes and ser-
vices stands in stark contrast to the considerable difficulties at the policy level. The 
worldwide volume of what we could term the "climate protection industry" has now been 
estimated at € 3.5 billion (Innovas 2010). Climate-friendly technologies are experiencing 
unusually dynamic growth and competition for such technologies in industrial policy has 
not only spread to developed industrial countries, but also emerging markets such as China 
and India. Competition for leading positions in the global market for these future tech-
nologies is currently the most powerful driving force of climate protection. More than that: 
in some countries, this driving force is causing unexpected acceleration. This means we are 
not just experiencing the feared acceleration of climate change with all the risks that such 
change entails. There are also examples of the acceleration of technical conversion to low-
carbon technologies being forced at a policy level. In terms of climate policy, this could 
mean that pioneering countries will first enforce this conversion systematically, then force 
such conversion on competitors and finally contribute themselves as trendsetters to the 
rapid global diffusion of climate-friendly technologies and policies (Jänicke 2008, 2010). 
In this context, this paper will present eight empirical successful cases in which there has 
been acceleration in the speed of diffusion of climate-friendly technologies. The basic 
theory of this dynamic will first be discussed in terms of relevant literature, in order to 
provide an explanatory basis for the approach put forward in this paper. The policy-
induced market dynamic obviously has repercussions for the innovation process. However, 
the dynamics of the feedback mechanisms are much more complex. This will be made 
clear in an explanatory model for multiple feedback processes. Finally, this paper will ad-
dress the question of how this dynamic process can be configured within the framework of 
an effective innovation strategy for climate protection. 
Let us first consider some examples of the acceleration of diffusion in the climate sector. 
2 Selected examples of the acceleration of technical progress in cli-
mate-friendly technologies 
The examples of the acceleration of technical progress in climate-friendly technologies 
presented in this paper are cases in which the measures of an ambitious climate policy 
have successfully forced the diffusion of a certain low-carbon technology (or group of 
technologies), thereby triggering an innovation dynamic that makes it possible to make al-
ready ambitious climate targets even stricter (see Table 1). The examples were selected 
from best practice. This is based primarily on acceleration: a diffusion speed for the rel-
evant technology (group) above and beyond the set target, although it also implicitly in-
cludes the associated effect on climate protection and the advantages associated with 
market growth. 




Both unfavourable developments and limiting factors are therefore methodically disre-
garded. An evaluation of the efficiency of the instruments themselves, e.g. the enforced 
solar power subsidies in Germany and Spain (see Frondel and Ritter 2010), is also not part 
of this study. Methodical restriction to best practice naturally also excludes cases of politi-
cal "deceleration" (examples of this being the withdrawal of the photovoltaic subsidies 
introduced in Japan after the 1973 oil crisis or the ending of wind power subsidies in 
Denmark after the change in government in 2001, although these successful ideas were re-
sumed after a few years in both cases). 
The examples are intended to reflect the range of variations in the presented phenom-
enon. They do not just involve renewable energies, of which there are now numerous ex-
amples of successful promotion. Focus is also placed on increases in energy efficiency that 
have been forced by policy and often viewed as the difficult part of climate policy. The 
examples come from highly developed industrial countries such as Germany, Great Britain 
or Japan, as well as emerging markets such as China and India. 
Table 1: Examples of innovation dynamics induced by climate policy 
Case study Country Market effects Innovation effects Political reper-
cussions  
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2.1 The promotion of renewable energies 
2.1.1 Germany 
Next to Great Britain and Denmark, Germany has the strictest climate targets in the EU (if 
you exclude Luxembourg on the grounds of its cross-border energy dependencies). It has 
therefore proven to be a major player in this political sector. 
This climate policy had several features in its favour. It arose as a subject that reached 
across all the parties, in which the opposing environmental protection interests and the in-
terests of those in favour of nuclear power converged (Jänicke 2010). The second positive 
initial feature was that the collapse of the East German heavy industry after reunification 
led to reductions in CO2. Thirdly, a feed-in tariff for electricity from renewable energies 
was introduced early on in 1991, representing a valuable source of information and experi-
ence. Another feature was the innovative approach of German climate policy, given fur-
ther emphasis as "ecological modernisation" in the coalition agreements of the red/green 
Federal Government in 1998 and 2002. 
The unexpected acceleration of the speed of diffusion of renewable energies (and building 
energy efficiency) was the consequence of extensive measures introduced by the new Fed-
eral Government in 1998, a coalition of Social Democrats and the Green Party. There was a 
significant increase in the existing feed-in tariffs for renewable energies. As a result, the 
Kyoto target of reducing greenhouse gases by 21% by 2012 was exceeded by 2007 and this 
surprise effect also made its mark in renewable energies (Figure 1). 
Figure 1: Share of renewable electricity in Germany 1998-2010 and targets for 2020 
 
(Data: Statistisches Bundesamt 2010) 
 




In 2000, the Federal Government was still focusing on the target of increasing the propor-
tion of electricity generated by renewable energies by at least 20% by 2020. The growth 
effect triggered by this policy made it possible to raise the target in 2009 to at least 30%. A 
higher target of 35% was specified in the Federal Government energy concept in Septem-
ber 2010 (BMWi and BMU 2010). A figure of 38.6% is officially expected in the 2010 national 
action plan for renewable energies (Federal Government 2010). The sector itself is predict-
ing 47% for the same year (Renewable Energies Agency 2010). The main reason for this new 
approach was the particular dynamism in the innovation process, indicated (for example) 
by the fact that the forced promotion of the new energies after 1998 triggered a sharp in-
crease in new patents in this area. The effectiveness of solar and wind power has been 
constantly increasing. There have been major reductions in production costs. In 2009, this 
leading industry on the world market created / secured 340,000 jobs (Figure 2). 
Figure 2: Employment in the renewable energy sector 1998-2009 and forecast 2020 
 
(Data: BMU 2010) 
2.1.2 Spain 
Spain has rapidly become a global player with high growth in renewable energies – particu-
larly wind power and photovoltaics. The dominant instrument of this growth was also an at-
tractive feed-in tariff (Bechberger 2009). Despite a reduction in the feed-in tariff, the set tar-
get for solar electricity was reached ahead of schedule in 2007 and far exceeded in the follow-
ing year. The Spanish government has raised its 20% target for the proportion of power gen-
erated by renewable energies in 2020 to an official expectation of 22.7%. The ambitious 
Spanish EU target of achieving a 40% target for the proportion of electricity generated by re-
newable energies in 2020 is also likely to be exceeded, according to official forecasts (ENDS 
Europe 19.4.2010). Around 200,000 jobs have been created in the sector (Bechberger 2009). 
In April 2010, the Spanish power company Iberdrola announced that it would be building one 
of the world's largest wind parks in Romania, generating 1,500 MW. 




This development of renewable energies in Spain is particularly noteworthy, as it is in stark 
contrast to its failure in other areas of climate policy: the proportion of greenhouse gases has 
risen by 52.5% between 1990 and 2007. This means the relatively easy Kyoto target (+ 15%) 
has been missed by quite some way. Perhaps the most obvious explanation is that, in contrast 
to Germany, the electricity industry invested early in renewable energies and has since ex-
perienced international success on this market (Bechberger 2009). Experience has shown that 
such a strong player has little interest in energy efficiency as part of end consumption and of-
ten opposes measures against such efficiency. Furthermore, the relatively easy Kyoto target 
was hardly an incentive to make an effort in this area. The low significance of climate policy 
as a driving force is an indication of the independent economic significance of renewable en-
ergies in this country. 
2.1.3 China 
One might think that this dynamism was only possible in highly developed industrial count-
ries, but China as an emerging market also offers some striking examples. The develop-
ment target for solar power for 2020 has been increased five times. In the wind power sec-
tor, China may have started out with European technology, but is now becoming increas-
ingly independent. Setting ambitious development targets, the country has triggered a dy-
namic in wind power that has almost overwhelmed it. This is perhaps best expressed in this 
sequence of targets set for 2020 (China’s Clean Revolution 2008; REN21 2009; Pellman 
2010, and other sources): 
• 20 GW was the target in 2004 
• 30 GW was planned as the target in the long-term programme for renewable energies 
in 2007 
• 100 GW was formulated as the new target shortly afterwards 
• 150 GW was set as the "unofficial" target in 2010. 
The unexpected development dynamic has therefore led to constantly higher targets for 
2020. In 2009, China built wind power plants with a capacity of 25 GW, expanded this year 
by 13 GW (CleanEdge 2010). This high growth led to discussions about a more far-reaching 
development target of 150 GW for the same date. According to the Chinese Renewable En-
ergy Industries Association, it may be possible to exceed even this target (Global Wind En-
ergy Council 3. 2. 2009). However, given annual growth rates of over 100%, it is unsurpris-
ing that the Chinese government is aiming to limit this extensive growth. 
There are now around 70 Chinese manufacturers achieving some success on the global 
market (REN21 10-2009). China's significant research and development efforts are support-
ing the secondary innovation process and economies of scale when it comes to renewable 
energies (similar technological success is also being achieved in the further development of 
flue gas desulphurisation technology in China). 





After the EU, USA and China, India has installed the most wind power plants. The largest 
manufacturer, Suzlon, has a world market share of 6% (2009). Since 2009, the country has 
also been pursuing an ambitious solar strategy with a dynamic approach that is worthy of 
note here. Experiences had been gathered earlier with a programme promoting electricity 
generated from renewable energies in locations with no power connections (Remote Vil-
lages Electrification Program). This brought electricity to thousands of small towns. It was 
also supported by Indian solar power providers. The government is attempting to combat 
technological deficiencies by promoting research and development. India established a 
special Ministry of New and Renewable Energy at an early stage. After the government 
raised its target for the development of renewable energies in general, it announced an 
ambitious programme at the end of 2009, aimed at generating at least 20 GW of domestic 
solar power for 2022. Amongst other things, 20 million solar lighting systems are to be in-
stalled in rural regions in the target year of 2022. The tools for this programme are a mix-
ture of binding feed-in tariff regulations and subsidies. The Indian "Solar Mission" is part of 
a climate policy package that also includes energy savings of 19,000 MW (almost 100 Mt. 
CO2), which will be made via tradeable "Energy Saving Certificates" amongst other initia-
tives (Ministry of Power 2009). 
What makes the Indian photovoltaic plans passed by the Cabinet so interesting is not just 
the systematic development of the country's own industry, which is intended to make India 
a "global leader in solar energy" (Government of India 2009). For the first time, plans will 
include possible acceleration through positive learning effects: "The ambitious target for 
2022 of 20,000 MW or more will be dependent on the 'learning' of the first two phases". The 
government will be focusing on competitive costs, innovations and the development of 
production capacities. "(A)fter taking into account the experience of the initial years, ca-
pacity will be aggressively ramped up to create conditions for up scaled and competitive 
solar energy" (Government of India 2009). 
2.2 Energy efficiency policy 
Are the successful renewable energies on which innovation research has been based so far 
a lucky special case in climate policy that is not representative of the situation as a whole? 
Isn't the promotion of energy efficiency, which is progressing much slower in the EU (for 
example), more difficult in principle? Isn't “green growth" much easier to achieve than the 
corresponding reductions required? Perhaps so, but nevertheless, without wishing to deny 
the varying levels of difficulty faced in environmental policies, there are still areas of 
common ground: the examples of energy efficiency policies below indicate that the posi-
tive feedback mechanisms of an ambitious climate policy can also apply here. The common 
denominator is a climate strategy based on technology that establishes and develops mar-
kets for energy-efficient innovative products. These products range from economical elec-
trical equipment to building technology to contracting. 





In Germany, energy saving and CO2 reduction in buildings is an example of the acceleration 
of the diffusion process linked to environmental policy and technology. This is evident in 
the change in public discourse, amongst other things. While conversation focused on par-
tial reduction of energy consumption in 1998, discussions 10 years later turned to the po-
litical promotion of positive energy houses – i.e. buildings that could contribute to power 
generation themselves. At the end of this dynamic learning process, the President of the 
main association of the German construction industry said in March 2008 that the construc-
tion sector played a "key role in climate protection" (press release 12-08 by the associa-
tion). 
Standards for energy consumption in new builds began to be made stricter in 1984 and this 
was continued in 1995, but it was in 2002 that the pace of this tightening of regulations 
really picked up speed. A further reduction in consumption was agreed in 2007 and 2009, 
accompanied by the announcement of further tightening of regulations in 2012. This stan-
dard would correspond to a saving of more than 80% in comparison to 1984. In terms of 
climate policy, there have also been important additional measures that affect existing 
buildings, particularly the eco-tax passed in 1999.There have also been subsidy measures 
for energy-based building renovations. For example, € 6 billion in subsidies were invested 
in the CO2 building renovation programme between 2006 and 2009. According to the Minis-
try of Construction, this triggered investments of € 30 billion and secured or created 
290,000 jobs (BMVBS 2010). Overall, climate-friendly investments in the building sector 
made up a tenth of all investments in Germany in 2005, reaching € 40 billion. Based on the 
additional climate protction measures of the "Meseberg Programme", this sum was revised 
as an estimate of € 54 billion (BMU and UBA 2009). Growth in this area affects a wide range 
of products, from insulation materials to heating systems. The number of heat pumps in 
production alone rose sixfold between 2003 and 2008 (BWP 2009). 
The change is evident (amongst other things) from its effects on CO2 emissions, which had 
been rising before. Between 1996 and 2008, they fell by around 40 Mt. (Figure 3). This par-
tial success in climate policy corresponded to the aforementioned economic success. How-
ever, it only came to public attention in the context of the climate change warnings issued 
by the IPCC (2007). The decision to make minimum energy requirements stricter for new 
builds was taken in the same year. 




Figure 3: CO2 emission of households in Germany 1990-2008 
 
(Data: BMU 2010) 
The 2010 energy concept put forward by the Federal Government now intends to further 
tighten the regulations: by 2020, all new builds are to be "climate-neutral". By 2050, "all 
buildings should be almost entirely climate-neutral". The renewal rate should rise from 1% 
to 2%. By 2020, heating requirements should drop by 20%. The aforementioned building 
renovation programme is to be continued accordingly (BMWi and BMU 2010). However, for 
the moment subsidies have been reduced for house renovations, due to budget restric-
tions. 
2.2.2 Great Britain 
The acceleration of technical conversion to climate-friendly energy technologies has also 
been forced at a policy level in other EU countries. Great Britain, the second European 
leader in climate policy, has a climate policy advantage similar to Germany – the genera-
tion of electricity from coal was phased out early on for political reasons by former Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher. This took a little of the shock value away from ambitious cli-
mate targets. Since then, the country has far exceeded its relatively high Kyoto target for 
the reduction of greenhouse gases (minus 12.5% by 2012). A reduction of over 20% is ex-
pected for 2010. 
Great Britain was the first industrial country to set a legally binding reduction target of "at 
least 26%" for 2020 (80% for 2050) in the 2008 Climate Change Act. In May 2009, the target 
was increased to 34%. In January 2010, the Environmental Audit Committee of the House of 
Commons recommended an even stricter climate target "beyond the commitments we have 
already made". Instead of the previous target of reducing greenhouse gases by 34% by 
2020, the Government is to aim for a 42% reduction (House of Commons 2010). 




In addition to the increased use of gas, British success has mainly been achieved in energy 
efficiency. Great Britain's aim was to improve energy efficiency by 9% by 2016. A figure of 
18% is now expected. All new builds are expected to be "zero-carbon" in Great Britain by 
the same year (Ecofys et al. 2006; OECD 2009). The measures implemented include the 
successful Energy Efficiency Commitment, which requires the energy industry to imple-
ment measures to encourage private customers to save energy. More than half the savings 
have come from heat insulation measures. Another effect of this policy was the rapid mar-
ket success of economical electrical equipment. 
The British successes in increasing energy efficiency are of interest here, as they stand in 
stark contrast to the development of renewable energies, which was only addressed as a 
more significant topic in 2010. 
2.2.3 Ireland 
Ireland is also a remarkable example of an accelerating climate policy: in addition to the 
target of a 40% proportion of "green" electricity for 2020, it has also set an ambitious tar-
get of 20% energy savings by 2020. Ireland has managed to become the country with the 
most extensive energy savings in the OECD. Energy intensity has been reduced annually by 
3.4% between 1990 and 2007, far above the OECD average of 1.5% (OECD 2009: 77). The 
energy strategy has helped efficient technologies become a success on the market, par-
ticularly in the industrial and buildings sectors. The "Sustainable Energy Authority of Ire-
land" (SEAI), founded in 2002, has played a major role. According to government estimates, 
Ireland's efficiency target for 2016 within the EU framework will be significantly exceeded, 
as in Great Britain. The 2007 energy action plan, which has already proved successful, was 
made even stricter in 2009. This was linked in part to the participation of a green party in 
the government. The SEAI "Strategic Plan 2010-2015" is an interesting example of enforced 
modernisation in the whole energy sector on the basis of successes in the energy efficiency 
sub-sector. The energy efficiency policy is to be continued – including the involvement of 
the energy sector and "energy service companies" – and should save € 25 billion in the 
buildings sector alone. 
The 25-year vision of an entirely "green" electricity supply and electricity exporting on this 
basis is now being formulated for renewable energies too. One of the major players here is 
Siemens Ireland (ENDS Europe 29.3. 2010). The programme has a clear approach in terms 
of industrial policy: the energy policy is intended to increase competitiveness, reduce 
costs, boost employment and make Ireland a "globally recognised centre of expertise" (SEAI 
2010). It remains to be seen whether Ireland's acute financial problems will dampen the 
country's ambitions when it comes to climate policy. 
2.2.4 Japan 
The example of the Japanese "Top Runner" programme is well known, classifying the most 
energy-efficient top model in a product category as the benchmark for a binding standard. 
The motto "Developing the world’s best energy-efficient appliances" also demonstrates real 




ambition in terms of industrial policy (ECCJ 2008). Most of the 21 regulated products 
(there are now 23) have reached the top standard ahead of schedule or exceeded it, lead-
ing to the definition of a new Top Runner standard each time. According to Nordqvist, this 
has led to a cycle of standard setting – compliance period – evaluation and revision – and 
renewed standard setting (Nordqvist 2006). For example, computers were meant to be 
consuming 83% less electricity on average by 2005. This target was reached already in 
2001. A second standard was set for 2007. Again the expected reduction of 69% has been 
surpassed (minus 81%). Now a third standard for 2011 was set with an expected reduction 
of 78% (METI 2010). The more modest target for cars for 2010 (minus 23%) had already 
been reached five years earlier. Furthermore, a new standard was defined with the aim of 
further savings of 29% (ECCJ 2008). The Top Runner programme is generally considered to 
be highly successful. It promoted competitiveness for the corresponding products. Despite 
fears, it has not resulted in higher production costs. 
3 Theoretical interpretation 
The following interpretation of the listed examples is from the bottom up and seeks ex-
planations for the phenomenon of accelerated technical change in the climate sector. Such 
a process is widely used in scientific policy advice. It differs from the – predominantly 
mono-disciplinary – examination of set theories in academia. Given the relative novelty of 
the phenomenon and the political relevance of the subject, a certain level of openness in 
the explanation seems justifiable. 
Before going into an explanatory approach, the special nature of environmental innova-
tions needs to be addressed. In this case, we are not just talking about a specific technol-
ogy-based policy – a climate policy relying on marketable technical solutions. It is also 
based on technical innovations to a great extent and these innovations display significant 
special features. This special nature of the innovations is a major factor in the shaping of 
the phenomenon of stricter climate policy measures linked to environmental policy and 
technology, which is under discussion here. 
3.1 The special nature of innovations in environmental and climate protection 
Nowhere are innovations as often under discussion as when it comes to environmental and 
climate policy. And for good reasons. Environmental innovations in general, and climate-
related innovations in particular, have particularly special features in comparison to other 
innovations. Firstly, they are a prerequisite for long-term industrial growth, as they re-
quire an ever-increasing level of protection against ecological damage; this requirement 
alone makes ongoing innovation necessary. Secondly, as global industrialism is increasingly 
unable to rely on cheap raw materials, there is pressure to increase resource efficiency; 
this again means that ongoing innovation is required. The market-compliant technical an-
swers to both problems are the creation of environmental innovations and ongoing ecologi-
cal modernisation (Jänicke 1984, 2008; Jänicke and Jacob 2007). This leads to the third 
special feature of ecological innovations: more than most technical innovations, envi-




ronmental innovations have both, a globale and a future market potential. The fourth spe-
cial feature is that eco-efficient innovations that also save on resources make a positive 
contribution to productivity. These four reasons explain why there has been no general 
competition that would be to the detriment of the environment (“race to the bottom”) 
and why developments have actually mainly been the exact opposite (Vogel 1995; Hettige 
et al. 1996; Jänicke 1998a; Wheeler 2001; Holzinger 2007). Fifthly, however, envi-
ronmental innovations are also characterised by the fact that they are largely dependent 
on political support in terms of market failure (Johnstone 2007; Ernst & Young 2006; see 
Jänicke 1978, 2008). Although the market is constantly yielding technical innovations, in-
cluding those in the environmental sector, this is hardly enough on its own to generate the 
acceleration dynamic described in this paper. 
This acceleration is also necessary in terms of policy standards, as the dynamics of global 
environmental problems mean that the ecological innovation process needs to be highly ef-
fective. The concept of the "Green New Deal", based on state intervention to resolve cri-
ses, has become relevant in this context. 
The acceleration of climate change has made the question of the political forcing of tech-
nical change more important. In this regard, it has also become clear that these are more 
than normal innovations that the market can bring about on its own (such as increasing the 
efficiency of coal-fired power plants). An appropriately ambitious innovation strategy can 
be configured as follows: 1. It can aim towards radical innovations far beyond the rebound 
effects triggered by the complete separation of the problem variables from economic 
growth. 2. It can increase the level of diffusion. Technical solutions that are restricted to 
niche markets or the OECD area alone are unsuitable for climate policy. 3. It can increase 
the speed of diffusion, i.e. the annual diffusion rate in a country. The feared acceleration 
of global warming (IPCC 2007) makes the acceleration of conversion to low-carbon tech-
nologies a central topic for discussion. 
3.2 Research approaches 
At this point, it is crucial to mention economic literature, which focuses on the signifi-
cance of market successes and economies of scale. The interplay of market success and 
secondary innovations when it comes to manufacturing costs and product quality is also a 
major factor in this subject area. It has already been examined, using the German policy 
that promotes renewable energies as an example (Jacobsson and Lauber 2006; see Mez 
2007). The dynamic development in renewable energies is also the subject of theoretical 
interpretation in a Japanese study of PV. Watanabe et al. have described the interaction 
of technical innovation cycles with market cycles as "virtuous cycle" (Watanabe et al. 
2010). However, the picture is only fully complete once the "policy cycle" – from "agenda 
setting" to the evaluation of policy outcomes – is included, having been a key category in 
policy analysis since Sabatier (Sabatier 1999). It is obviously this interaction of three cycles 
that characterises the dynamics of innovation processes induced by environmental and 




climate policy (see below). Competition in industrial policy for climate-friendly technolo-
gies is shaped by these multiple dynamics and strengthens it at the same time. 
For a long time, economists have neglected the role of the state and politics when it 
comes to environmental innovations or have seen political regulation as more of a detri-
mental factor for innovations. However, there have been empirical studies on the signifi-
cance of state regulations in relation to the creation of environmental innovations since 
the 1980s (Ashford et al. 1985). Later, both Wallace and, above all, Porter have taken 
steps in this direction (Porter and van der Linde 1995; Wallace 1995; see also Hemmel-
skamp 2000; Frohwein 2005; Jacob 2005; Ekins and Venn 2006; Reid and Miedzinski 2008). 
More recent examinations focus on different instruments that look at the entire innovation 
cycle: from invention to market introduction (innovation) to market penetration (diffusion) 
(see Hemmelskamp et. al. 2000: 135-138; Jänicke and Lindemann 2010). Driesen (2010) in 
a remarkable approach proposed a new type of environmental law which generally stimu-
lates eco-innovation.  
Now, however, the listed examples demonstrate a situational improvement in opportuni-
ties for policy action. This is a familiar subject in policy analysis. In "multiple-stream the-
ory", the convergence of (a) discussed problems, (b) discussed solutions and (c) political 
opportunities is taken as a situational opportunity for action (Kingdon 1995; Zahariadis 
1999; Jänicke 1998). Zundel et al. (2003) have elaborated on discontinuities in the innova-
tion process and the significance of the policy "window of opportunity" from an economic 
point of view. Fortunate circumstances or points in time are highly significant in climate 
policy. This applies particularly to the year 2007, with the convergence of (a) new infor-
mation on climate change (IPCC 2007), (b) competition in industrial policy for climate-
friendly technologies and (c) the G8 Heiligendamm resolutions. This is helpful when it 
comes to understanding the background of the examples, but there is more to them than 
this. They are situational opportunities for policy action that can offer chances for market 
success on one hand and new technical potential in the innovation process on the other 
hand – as a result of an ambitious, technology-based climate strategy. 
Literature on environmental policy capacity for action is also relevant to the subject under 
discussion (OECD 1995; Jänicke and Weidner 1998; Dalal-Clayton and Bass 2002). Policy ca-
pacity for action can be generally defined in negative terms as the limit beyond which the 
success of any measures cannot be expected. Lack of knowledge, lack of financial re-
sources, an incompetent state apparatus, a weak national innovation system (OECD 1999) 
or a generally insufficient level of development are just some of the factors involved here. 
In addition to the general negative definition, there are positive additional specific capaci-
ties for action that are relevant here, including the capacity to achieve set targets. Pritt-
witz has used the example of the tightening of smog regulations to illustrate the positive 
effects of a developed capacity for action on policy ambitions (Prittwitz 1990). The ca-
pacity of a state can be well-developed in general, but be limited in terms of strict regula-
tions on climate protection. The subject may be blocked by dominant energy interests up 




to and including the media (as in the USA). There may be a lack of technical experience or 
domestic suppliers. 
The question of capacity for action is vital, because it fundamentally determines how real-
istic climate targets can be. This will be discussed in more detail in the next section. 
3.3 The significance of climate targets 
The successful cases of ecological modernisation presented here can naturally be con-
trasted with negative experiences in many countries and sectors. It is hardly surprising to 
find such deficits in countries that have only set undemanding targets or none at all. In 
policy analysis, targets are only useful as explanatory aids when combined with actors and 
implementation concepts. However, the lack of target specifications or the undemanding 
nature of such targets in relation to the innovation process can also be seen as an import-
ant indicator. Within the EU-15, countries with weak Kyoto targets for greenhouse gas re-
duction by 2012 also tend to be "unremarkable" in terms of innovation behaviour. This is 
hardly astonishing. However, what is remarkable is that countries with weak climate tar-
gets also tend to fail to achieve them. There are numerous countries with "weak" targets 
for greenhouse gases in the Kyoto process. These targets range from zero growth up to the 
permitted rise in emissions of up to 27% (Portugal). Measurements of emissions up to 2007 
have clearly shown: all the countries that deviate significantly from the Kyoto Protocol 
path also had undemanding targets. What is more: those weak targets were largely missed. 
The USA had no target at all for 2012; USA emissions rose by almost 17% (in comparison to 
1990). Overall, this could be referred to as an underchallenged syndrome (Jänicke 2010). 
This concept is particularly relevant in cases where there had been capacity for action for 
a more ambitious policy at an earlier stage. This applies not only to the USA, but also Ja-
pan – both countries having played a pioneering role in environmental policy at an interna-
tional level in the 1970s. 
However, the reverse argument – namely, that countries with highly ambitious envi-
ronmental or climate targets are systematically better – is simply not true. At the begin-
ning of the 1990s, a fair few industrial countries deliberately implemented incredibly strict 
climate targets in a "vacuum". As Tews and Binder (2006) have shown, "unrealistically" high 
targets mostly led to a "downward" revision as soon as it came to actually implementing 
them. In fact, they were often simply ignored. One example is the German CO2 target in 
1990, which required a 25-30% reduction for 2005. It had been all but forgotten by the tar-
get year. Other countries followed the German example: Denmark, Austria, Luxembourg, 
Australia and New Zealand intended to reduce harmful CO2 emissions by 20% by 2005. The 
Netherlands defined a reduction target of 20-25% (in comparison with 1989/90) for all 
greenhouse gases for 2000 in its much-celebrated environmental plan. None of these tar-
gets were reached – they were all abandoned as soon as it came to their implementation 
(see Table 2). 




Table 2: Countries with ambitious climate targets that were abandoned 
Country Climate target 
(CO2) 
Period 
Netherlands (1991) - 20-25%  
(greenhouse gases) 
1989/90-2000 
Denmark (1990) - 20% 1988-2005 
Germany (1990) - 25-30% 1987-2005 
Austria (1990) - 20 % 1988-2005 
Luxembourg (1990) - 20 % 1990-2005 
Australia (1990) - 20 %  
(greenhouse gases) 
1988-2005 
New Zealand (1990) - 20 % 1990-2005 
(Source: Tews and Binder 2006) 
The logical conclusion is therefore: ambitious target specifications that are too much of a 
challenge for a country's capacity tend to be abandoned or neglected. Weak targets also 
offer no incentive for innovations. The optimum case lies between the two extremes, 
whereby the country's capacity for action is used in full, but not overloaded. This is most 
likely to occur where climate targets are based on the best available technology and there 
are existing domestic suppliers for this technology. These suppliers are also important 
partners for the new policy 
3.4 The triple cycle of innovation 
At the heart of the subject under discussion here lies the interaction between three pro-
cesses: firstly, policy influence on market development; secondly, the effects of the in-
duced market dynamic on the development of innovations, and thirdly, the repercussions 
of the market and innovation dynamic on the policy process (Figure 4). These three areas 
have an intrinsic logic, which is interestingly also reflected in the fact that their dynamic is 
presented as a cycle (Watanabe et al.2000). Since Sabatier (1999), the policy cycle has 
been defined in stages: agenda setting – target and policy formulation – decision – imple-
mentation – result. The final evaluation of the result usually leads to the setting of a new 
agenda. In addition to product development, investments and the final offer by a com-
pany, the market cycle involves demand, competition, price development and, above all, 
the induced demand for innovations that improve product quality and reduce manufactur-
ing costs. This affects the third cycle, the innovation cycle. It comprises invention and de-
velopment until the product is ready for the market, market introduction, the actual inno-
vation, and finally the diffusion of the product that, if successful, will provide new incen-




tives for innovations. The markets for climate-friendly low-carbon technologies are usually 
organised markets. They are "policy-driven" (Ernst & Young 2006), usually with a mix of 
climate policy and industrial policy motives. In essence, an ambitious climate strategy in 
the sense of Section 3.1 is a government strategy. Its successes can trigger positive feed-
back for the policy. Policy can also promote the innovation process directly. It can provide 
fundamental support for new technology via the provision of targeted R&D resources. 
Above all, targeted state R&D resources can support the secondary market-driven innova-
tion process, which improves the quality and manufacturing costs of climate-friendly tech-
nology in competition. Ambitious government target specifications can also offer a stimu-
lating long-term perspective for the process. Policy therefore controls market and innova-
tion processes, and both can result in positive feedback for the policy: in addition to the 
intended effect on the climate, market success for low-carbon technologies also has a 
positive effect on employment and supplier interests, which backs up the policy. The inno-
vation process supported by the market and state creates additional action options for a 
technology-based policy. More effective photovoltaic systems or efficiency technologies 
could justify more ambitious climate targets in practice and market success encourages 
the political acceptance of this. 
Figure 4: Policy acceleration: The triple cycle of innovation 
 
 
Overall, the three cycles work in such a way that they boost each other and enable each 
other to experience positive feedback. As cycles, they tend to carry the process forward to 
a higher level. The amendment of laws at the end of a policy cycle is a typical process 
here. 




The innovation dynamic presented here is naturally subject to international framework 
conditions: the policy process is subject to this influence in two ways. National gov-
ernments are influenced to a greater or lesser degree by global climate policy. Further-
more, a large number of governments are also subject to the conditions of innovation 
competition for low-carbon technologies, based on industrial policy. National suppliers in 
this sector are also usually exposed to international competition and the domestic markets 
are influenced by this combination. Even the national innovation system is not free from 
international influences and is often subject to competition amongst research suppliers. 
The diagram shown in Figure 4 refers indirectly to three typical innovation policy pitfalls 
that can be classified as follows: 
1. Policy oblivion: It is mainly neo-classical economists who tend to neglect the role of the 
state and policy or even ignore this role as a disruptive factor. Although this may well be 
justifiable in the case of some innovations, environmental innovations are characterised by 
the fact that they are dependent on policy (see Section 3.1). In climate protection, per-
formance requirements for the innovation process are so high that active state involve-
ment is essential. This involvement does not mean bureaucratic state intervention, but ra-
ther a widespread, exertion of influence weighed up beforehand – and this is precisely the 
state of most policy consulting today (see SRU 2004: 525ff.). 
2. Innovation oblivion: The opposite is the case here – radical climate politicians tend to 
focus on massive promotion of the required better technology, without offering any basis 
for this process in the innovation system. In the case of the Germany promotion of renew-
able energies, such innovation oblivion could well have slowed the drop in prices for 
"green" electricity and made success less likely for German suppliers on the global market. 
However, the actual German climate policy after 1998 has triggered a boom in new pa-
tents for this technology and the infrastructure for corresponding innovation promotion 
does indeed exist. 
3. Market oblivion: This pitfall mainly exists amongst research politicians. Too much is ex-
pected from one-sided R&D promotion. The pull of a high market dynamic is underesti-
mated here. Usually forced by policy, this market dynamic – as a technology pull – is a de-
cisive factor for the multiple innovation process under examination here. 
3.5 On the governance of climate policy acceleration 
The aforementioned examples of "best practice" in climate protection suggest that there 
are political conclusions to be drawn here. In the light of the presented cases and the phe-
nomenon of multiple positive feedback mechanisms, can a more ambitious climate policy 
be justified, at least for countries with sufficient capacity? The quoted example of Indian 
solar power promotion represents an interesting attempt by a government to move in this 
direction. 
The following generalisations seem possible (with all due reservations): 




• In addition to prior experience and the existence of suitable providers, the prerequisite 
for such processes is the existence of a government R&D research environment that 
supports the secondary innovation process (also in China and India). 
• The decisive factor is then the definition of calculable climate targets at the limits of 
the capacity that is technically feasible for a country. As shown, the targets need to be 
ambitious and realistic. The calculability of the targets is based on the programme of 
implementation and its foreseeable effects. 
• If the targets are implemented successfully and therefore effectively boost market 
growth for climate-friendly technologies, this results not only in economies of scale but 
also secondary innovations: new processes that reduce manufacturing costs (e.g. the 
drop in costs for photovoltaics in Germany and Spain) and product innovations, e.g. 
those that improve the energy efficiency of a product (as is the case with wind power 
in Germany and China). 
• Market success not only generates jobs, but also interest from new suppliers, which 
further legitimises the ambitious policy measures and often pushes them aside. This 
tends to broaden the policy conditions for action and increase the level of policy aspi-
rations. In the end, climate targets that were once the subject of dispute are often 
widely accepted. More far-reaching targets can even be accepted (according to Infrat-
est Dimap, 62% of German citizens surveyed at the end of 2009 stated that an ambi-
tious climate policy is an advantage for the economy). 
• The effects of international competition also play a part here: competitors from other 
countries can further develop the successful technology and offer these developments 
themselves on the global market. This gives rise to a situation in which the progress of 
a pioneering country is only held back by the need for constantly new innovations. This 
means international industrial policy competition can also accelerate the triple cycle 
(Figure 4). 
4 Conclusion: Save the climate who can 
The positive feedback process phenomenon that can be triggered by an ambitious climate 
policy, as described in this paper, is extremely significant in terms of current climate pol-
icy. Even if innovation strategies are naturally exposed to a relatively open framework of 
action, certain generalisations are possible and allow political conclusions to be drawn. 
Climate policy is intrinsically linked to the pioneers. And pioneers have mostly advantages. 
In terms of climate policy, this justifies unilateral, unconditional ambitious policies, albeit 
only in countries that possess the necessary capacity to act. The examples presented here 
indicate the wide scope of these countries. 
However, there are also sufficient plausible arguments in favour of the enforcement of 
pioneering policies by those who are capable of doing so when it comes to industrial pol-
icy. A country with a set target level is only a pioneer for a certain period of time. Part of 




the innovation process is the take-up of innovations by competitors, who then further de-
velop those innovations and offer them on international markets. It is this innovation com-
petition that characterises climate-friendly, low-carbon technologies. Top runner positions 
and "first mover advantages" (Porter) are therefore to be considered in dynamic terms: 
they are only held back over time by the need for more ambitious targets. 
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